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ON DISARMAMENT**

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held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
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COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. BLUSZTAJN

(Poland)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA
Mr. C. A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. H. M. da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. G. GAVRILOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG
U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. J. R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. WINKLER
Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. N. KRISHNAN
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. E. FRANCO
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. F. CORREA

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO
Mr. B. O. TONWE

Poland: Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania: Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden: Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. L. EDELSTAM
Mr. I. VIRGIN
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. V. P. SUSLOV
Mr. I. M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic: Mr. H. KHALLAFF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. I. F. PORTER
Mr. R. I. T. CROMARTIE

United States of America: Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. G. BREIM
Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN

Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Poland): The meeting is called to order. It gives me great pleasure to preside over the three hundredth plenary meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): It is with considerable hesitation that I take the floor today. More than three months of precious time has elapsed since our session began with many optimistic statements from all quarters that this would be the ENDC session of success (ENDC/PV.287). A formidable agenda was before us in the form of a number of resolutions (ENDC/185) adopted by large majorities of Member States at the United Nations General Assembly and clamouring for urgent action.
3. Now that half the time which is normally at the disposal of the Committee for its yearly session has passed there is regrettably very little progress, if any at all, to register. No draft text of a non-proliferation treaty, which was supposed to be our main working document, has been presented. Nor has any discussion even begun yet on the other important items mandated to the Conference by the General Assembly. Worse still, I think that while our work has lingered the political climate seems to have become less and not more favourable.
4. In these circumstances I feel compelled to add the voice of my delegation to the voices of those here who have already aired their disappointment and misgivings. The justification for this is that my Government, I believe like all others represented here, ardently desires progress with regard to nuclear disarmament and definitely favours a containment of the spread of nuclear weapons by an internationally binding treaty.
5. My delegation is so positively interested; indeed, that we could not conceal a certain disappointment about the long period of non-consultation within the Eighteen Nation Committee, which is after all the main negotiating body for disarmament. I refer to our statement at the last meeting before the recess (ENDC/PV.296). We are all in this Committee, whether classified as aligned or as non-aligned States, the trustees of the United Nations, with the task of finding solutions to disarmament issues which are beneficial to all and acceptable to all. So at this stage we should not be solipsistically confined to the national considerations which ultimately will decide whether our Governments adhere or not to specific treaty formulations.

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We are here joined in a collective responsibility to find a constructive outline for a treaty which might be acceptable to all States. But now the non-aligned Members of this Committee run the extra risk that because they can only submit their amendments -- which are of course legitimate -- at a relatively advanced stage they might then be accused of delaying the negotiations.

6. There are three issues in particular on which some rather fundamental differences of approach remain and on which it will be necessary to express our views: the general question of assurances about tangible steps of nuclear disarmament to be coupled with or to follow a non-proliferation treaty; further, the specialized problems of so-called nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and of control measures -- that is, international safeguards. A solution of these issues, and perhaps most crucially the issue of what control system to apply, could only be furthered by the give-and-take in an open debate, unfettered by positions locked in advance. As a contribution to such a debate I want today to devote some attention to the control issue, leaving the newer and very exciting subject of nuclear explosions for civilian uses to be examined at a subsequent meeting.

7. The question of control in connexion with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of truly universal concern. During the recent recess this issue was apparently in the focus of intense discussions outside the framework of this Committee, and more particularly in one of the regional groupings. Fears were expressed in some quarters, public and private, that unbalanced control measures could cause severe drawbacks for non-nuclear-weapon States in the way of technological underdevelopment, industrial espionage and commercial discrimination.

8. I think it would be very useful if we in this Committee made a comprehensive review of the problems involved and disposed once and for all of the worries or reduced them to reasonable proportions. Let us then start by recognizing that the methods of controlling nuclear activities must always be subject to two separate sets of considerations: one, their value for achieving the goal of facilitating disarmament; second, their obligation not to hurt unnecessarily interests of economic development and fair competition in commerce. "Not to hurt unnecessarily" is a key phrase in this latter connexion because if there should be intrinsic conflict between the two sets of interests I take it we would agree that disarmament should be given supremacy by all of us. But first we are in duty bound to study such control arrangements as might satisfy both criteria.

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9. It should have become evident already from statements made in this Committee, and based on qualified expert advice, that the fears in relation to "spin-off" and "industrial espionage" have been exaggerated. Relying on our own experience, my delegation is convinced that research, development and production in reactor technology and similar fields would not have to be hampered by lack of the knowledge obtained through manufacture of nuclear weapons. Twenty years ago that may have been the case, but since then nuclear technology has been widely disseminated to and further developed by many non-nuclear-weapon States.

10. There remains, however -- besides the use of nuclear explosives for civil engineering projects, about which I intend to speak at a forthcoming meeting -- the demand that control measures should not hurt equal opportunities for trade or, to use the more negative expression, preserve or increase the risk of commercial discrimination. Some such risks exist in the world today. It must be the function of a non-proliferation treaty to eliminate them or at least reduce them -- certainly not to aggravate them.

11. Long before any serious negotiations on non-proliferation started, the major countries exporting atomic fuel and equipment individually assumed the responsibility that their contribution to the internationalization of the peaceful atom should not at the same time lead to a promotion of the spread of nuclear weapons. Exclusively peaceful use has thus usually been made a condition for the sale of such products. A structure of agreements providing for bilateral, regional or international safeguards has indeed been built up over the years, and now covers such a large part of the plutonium production in non-nuclear-weapon countries that a considerable arms control effect has, in fact, been achieved. This control machinery has been established within the context of international trade and co-operation, without any plan for how it should be fitted into a disarmament measure such as a non-proliferation treaty.

12. Obviously, transition from this complicated network of rights and obligations to a straightforward control formula contained in a non-proliferation treaty will give rise to many problems on the bilateral and regional level. Such transition will necessarily take some time, and that is a consideration which ought to be incorporated in the treaty in some way and made applicable to all signatories, not only those of

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the European regional system of co-operation. A similar stipulation for arranging the transition is contained in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (ENDC/186).

13. Many bilateral arrangements recently have been or are in the process of being replaced by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, thus providing in effect a certain amount of streamlining. This by the way refers to my country, as the Swedish Government has expressed itself in favour of placing all its present nuclear activities -- those hitherto governed by bilateral safeguards agreements and those hitherto not covered -- under IAEA control. The increasing use of IAEA safeguards is an important element when it comes to choosing the method of control, because it should be beyond discussion that the application of one system of safeguards to the activities of all countries would be the perfect solution. The interests of disarmament and, at the same time, fair and equal opportunities would thus be simultaneously protected.

14. When the control measures for a treaty on non-proliferation are to be prescribed one must bear in mind at least three very different situations which might entail rather stark imperfections -- as some of them already do. This of course amounts to saying that we are confronted with at least three types of challenges to be surmounted. The most dangerous and intractable one is, of course, that of non-signatory States, where there is a latent risk that they might turn towards nuclear-weapon production and a probably more definite risk that they would profit in the commercial field by not being tied to common rules. A second category is that of nuclear-weapon States, which would, if not bound by the same obligations as others, evidently be free not to participate in the disarmament undertaking and also left to continue only voluntarily to apply safeguard rules to their exports. The third situation is met with in regard to closed regional systems such as the one operated within the European Economic Community, if controls should continue to consist of inspection by themselves of the peaceful nuclear activities within their countries and if the universal system of control obligations should not be specifically prescribed for their exports. Since each of these groups comprises the technologically and commercially strongest nations in regard to nuclear activities, the problems confronting us are of no small dimensions.

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15. The emphasis has here been on control through a safeguard system. In addition, however, supplier nations in the nuclear field have applied a variety of policies in order to diminish the consequences of possible non-compliance with agreed obligations. Stipulations as to a first option for buying back surplus plutonium produced with fuel supplied, and further, requests for specifications of any project involved before a fuel delivery is approved, and reservations as to approval beforehand of any resale of fuel supplied and equipment to third countries are some examples of these policies.

16. It seems reasonable to assume that these policies will continue as part of the trade treaty structure even after a non-proliferation treaty has been signed. But after the conclusion of a treaty, with its general prohibition of the use of nuclear material for weapons production and its special control rules, the need for rigidity in applying rules of this other kind would decrease.

17. The question of safeguards should, of course, not be confused with this question of other restrictive policies by supplier nations. The fears of commercial discrimination under a non-proliferation treaty expressed in the public debate seem to a large extent to have been connected with these policies rather than with the question of safeguards as such. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the present confused situation with regard to various safeguards systems may also be detrimental to trade in the nuclear field. In fact, commercial policy-makers now appear to be postponing further action in the hope that the Committee will provide a streamlined framework for international safeguards by using the agency set up inter alia for this purpose, the International Atomic Energy Agency.

18. When arriving at the stage where we should be formulating the principles on controls, the work must be governed by four criteria: effectiveness of coverage, credibility of safeguards, balance of obligations and commercial equity. I shall deal briefly with some alternatives of control formulae, trying to show how these criteria would work out in practice. I should have liked to do this in the tabular form or graphic form, but I have had to do it in words, although it is quite complicated. There is indeed a wide difference in value and hence in acceptability between the top and the bottom in such a list of formulae of decreasing ambition.

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(1) The most effective and the most balanced solution would be a universal and obligatory submission to safeguards of all nuclear industry of all parties to a treaty and of all transfers of nuclear material, principal nuclear facilities and certain specialized equipment for all purposes from, to and between all parties.

19. The effectiveness of the measure where accepted is striking. It would mean a real cut-off, thus showing the interrelation existing between horizontal and vertical proliferation and also the inherent value of safeguards as a tool for disarmament. This formula would further assure equity in relation to industrial development and commercial opportunities. The only remaining inequity would be caused by the existence of non-signatories. However, they also would have to accept some control, unless they preferred completely to avoid imports from the treaty area.

(2) A second but weaker formula would be the compulsory submission to safeguards of all peaceful nuclear activities -- I stress: only the peaceful activities -- of all parties and of all transfers from, to and between all parties.

20. This formula of control would mean a complete stop to all horizontal proliferation, including additions from abroad to nuclear weapon Powers. Their weapon manufacture would be isolated from foreign supply and from any connexion with peaceful activities. The formula would, however, have no disarmament effect on the independent production of nuclear weapons among those countries which engage in such production. Balance would be achieved as far as the controls are concerned with the exception -- which I have just mentioned -- of military activities. The formula would assure complete commercial equity except in relation to transfers to non-signatories in cases of competition between a signatory and a non-signatory State. That would of course constitute a serious disadvantage.

(3) If in a third example the specific provision for safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities within the nuclear-weapon countries is dropped from this last formula, controls will still remain on all their activities relying on foreign supplies because all transfers will be controlled. The complete stop for all horizontal proliferation will, as in the previous alternative, remain unchanged. A not inconsiderable amount of imbalance would however be introduced, creating in addition to the imbalance in relation to disarmament also the possibility of discrimination in regard to commercial markets within the nuclear weapon States between domestic and foreign suppliers. In addition, the deficiencies in regard to non-signatories would remain as in earlier examples.

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(4) I now come to possibility No. 4. At our meeting on 11 August 1966 my delegation proposed — as the earliest and easiest step on an agreed three-rung ladder towards a cut-off agreement — the application of safeguards initially simplified so as to cover, not all activities within countries, but all transfers for all purposes between all States (ENDC/PV.281, pp.516). We continue to regard that as an important and urgent measure, but would, it goes without saying, prefer those mentioned earlier. This later formula, of course, enters as an element in all of them. It is in a way a balanced measure, but is clearly somewhat deficient in effectiveness with regard to disarmament. It would leave only partly covered some States which are self-supporting both in uranium and in nuclear technology. That same effect on the nuclear weapon States was already accounted for in my formula No. 3. But it would strike at and stop all foreign supply for co-operation in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

21. Any limitation of this measure to transfers for peaceful activities only cannot be accepted, as it would provide an opportunity for unsound discrimination within the market of countries producing nuclear weapons. A nuclear-weapon country could then assign any project as a military one, thus avoiding controls on it.

(5) The current debate has also provided us with some completely unbalance formulae — for instance the one whereby safeguards would be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear weapon States only, and to all transfers to those States only. Such a formula is very unsatisfactory. It is unbalanced in all respects. From a commercial point of view it does not even fit the actual situation in the world, where many important supplier's request safeguards also on exports to nuclear weapon States. Whether safeguards on such transfers are stipulated in a treaty or not, suppliers who want to avoid any military utilization of their products would of course be free to continue, voluntarily and unilaterally, to request safeguards on those transfers, or use other prohibitory policies including safeguards on the sale of natural uranium to States producing nuclear weapons. But that policy will probably put them in an awkward position of commercial discrimination, making precisely those States which are the most ambitious in terms of disarmament also the most discriminated against commercially.

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(6) Finally, we must complete the list of alternatives by mentioning the zero formula: no safeguards clause at all. If recourse were had to that solution as the outcome of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on a non-proliferation treaty the credibility of adherence to the treaty would be severely damaged. In addition, such a treaty would then inherit the present complicated structure of control systems with all the risks for commercial compromise and discrimination at the expense of disarmament interests and with inequities between countries which would become more glaring as technological and industrial development proceeds in the nuclear field. We hope that such will not be the outcome of our endeavours.

22. Thus reviewing the existing situation and the various possibilities to satisfy the demands, first of disarmament, but also of equity and balance between nations in regard to prospects of development in the nuclear energy field, we can only come to the conclusion that a very strong code of ethics, applicable to all States, has to be built into the control clause of a non-proliferation treaty. Such a reliable and durable system of control has to be implemented through one single safeguard system, universally accepted and universally applicable, as is that of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I have, however, already argued for some leeway in regard to time-limited transitional arrangements. But the sooner the International Atomic Energy Agency is given the over-all responsibility for verification the better — both for the sake of equity and, first and foremost, for the sake of credibility of non-proliferation pledges.

23. May I, in a second and final section, touch on the major policy question which has so prominently preoccupied participants in the international debate on non-proliferation, namely the insistence that assurance be given by the nuclear-weapon-Powers that a treaty for this purpose should be "coupled with or followed by related measures for nuclear disarmament". I have sought not to lengthen my statement today by inserting quotations, but I cannot refrain from repeating the warnings uttered by Lord Chalfont and General Burns at our last meeting.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

24. In his farewell address Lord Chalfont said:

"... the principle must be accepted and clearly understood that if a non-proliferation treaty is not followed by serious attempts amongst the nuclear Powers to dismantle some of their own vast nuclear armory, then the treaty will not last, however precise its language may be. There is in my mind no doubt that if the non-nuclear Powers are to be asked to sign a binding non-proliferation treaty it must contain the necessary provisions and machinery to ensure that the nuclear Powers too take their proper share of the balance of obligations."

(ENDC/PV.299, para.10)

25. Just as lucidly the representative of Canada said:

"There is one prediction about this treaty which, in the Canadian view, can be made with assurance; it is that if there is no progress towards real disarmament an agreement on non-proliferation will not endure for more than relatively few years. This, we believe, is the reality of the situation ..." (ibid., para. 41)

26. The non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have throughout the discussion on non-proliferation formulated this as a demand that a treaty must contain an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon countries and the non-nuclear-weapon countries. That this opinion is shared by the wide majority of States has been amply demonstrated during the debates over the last years at the United Nations General Assembly. Its most pregnant form is found of course in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), (ENDC/161) quoted so often by us all in this Committee.

27. When there is repeated reference to that insistence on balanced obligations, it certainly does not stem from any desire to cause unnecessary difficulties in the already complicated negotiations on the non-proliferation issue. On the contrary, it is intended to try to make it clear that any draft treaty text that would not reflect this prospect for effective nuclear disarmament could hardly fulfil its purpose, namely, to induce all the non-nuclear-weapon States of importance in this connexion to come forward and accept their share of the obligations. What the world

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needs are trustworthy signals of a definitive change of direction, a turn downwards of the whole nuclear race. When I insist on such signs I am not defending any interest of any country in having nuclear weapons. But I am, I frankly admit, engaging in a campaign for nuclear disarmament for the sake of the world.

28. The delegation of Sweden has for long maintained that that general aim, as well as a guarantee for the effectiveness of the immediate treaty on non-proliferation, could best be obtained through simultaneous discussions intended for planning, in a coherent way, decisions on the items most closely related.

29. With your forbearance, Mr. Chairman, I shall emphasize once again the logical interdependence of the three elements which we have chosen to include in a "package", realizing of course that other items might be substituted: (1) Besides the non-proliferation treaty -- which is intended to achieve a blocking of what has now come to be labelled horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons to the present non-nuclear-weapon countries -- there is an urgent need for (2) a treaty banning underground nuclear tests. That is intended to hamper the race between nuclear-weapon Powers to increase the quality and refinement of their nuclear arms. (3) There is also a need for a cut-off agreement, implying the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes in all States, a measure directed against vertical proliferation as it would effectively prevent the nuclear-weapon Powers from increasing in the quantitative sense their present nuclear arms stocks. Both those latter agreements would also act as effective checks to proliferation by manufacture in presently non-nuclear-weapon States. Thus they tighten and reinforce each other.

30. We, the delegation of Sweden, have to recognize with regret, however, that at the present juncture the more or less simultaneous acceptance of this "package" is not immediately attainable. But what we must uphold is the demand that we should not -- within the framework of the agreement which is now foremost in our minds, the non-proliferation treaty -- cease to press for recognition of the necessity for rapid progress towards effective freezing and reversal of the present situation in the nuclear armament field.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

31. That recognition might in the context of a non-proliferation treaty be obtained through various means. One method might be the one which has already been presented by other representatives of the non-aligned delegations, notably by the representative of the United Arab Republic in his eloquent address to the Committee on 16 March (ENDC/PV.294, paras. 2 et seq.). This would consist of a formal link to be established between on the one hand, the obligations in the treaty of the non-nuclear-weapon countries not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons, and, on the other hand, an obligation by the nuclear-weapon countries to commit themselves to genuine disarmament measures in the nuclear weapon field. Mr. Khallaf, in the statement I have just referred to, said that that responsibility of the nuclear Powers should be embodied not in the preamble to the treaty but in a separate article, so as to endow it with full legal effect an an incontestably compelling character.

32. Without taking a final stand on this question before we have seen any treaty text, I must intimate that just to insert in a preamble some vague reference to an intention to proceed with further disarmament steps can hardly be enough in the eyes of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Nearly four years ago the preamble of the Moscow Treaty said that the nuclear weapon States as "Original Parties" were "Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end ..." (ENDC/100/Rev.1). But instead of signs of any advanced preparation for a comprehensive test-ban we find underground tests proceeding in a relentless crescendo in regard both to tempo and to yield. What was meant to be a temporary exemption from prohibitory rules seems instead to have been interpreted as a legitimization of underground testing.

33. As I said, without pronouncing myself on the formalities by which non-proliferation should be bound up with the pledge to proceed to real disarmament in the nuclear field, I want to explain that our worries are most concerned with the realities of the world today. The actual trends give no reassuring signs. The psychological climate would become different if the non-nuclear-weapon majority of States were given to understand, for example, real preparations were under way to dismantle test laboratories, that planning for an underground test ban was proceeding among experts, or that opinion-building was under way in public and parliamentary circles. A similar increase in confidence would be gained, for instance, if we were informed that an agreement between the super-Powers to halt the anti-ballistic-missile race was nearing completion.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

34. To conclude: any offer to forgo a nuclear option on the part of the nuclear weapon-States would serve as a reassurance to the have-nots that this first treaty would be effective and viable, and that it would truly initiate the process of nuclear disarmament. There is a deep worry and anxiety prevailing in the world today. Perhaps it already amounts to a lack of confidence in promises about disarmament. So many more signs point in the opposite direction -- towards continued escalation everywhere, and not least in the nuclear armaments race. How shall we be able to muster the optimism needed.

35. Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Our work has reached a stage where it may appear that everything has been said regarding the importance of the problem which concerns us, namely, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The discussion in the United Nations and the resolutions adopted in consequence, the thorough consideration which has been given to the subject here in our Committee, as well as the innumerable comments devoted to it throughout the world, have brought out very clearly the different aspects of the problem.

36. Those show, in the first place, that a further spread of nuclear weapons, that is to say, a multiplication of the number of States possessing nuclear weapons, in whatever form, constitutes a terrible threat to world peace.

37. They show, secondly, that the only means of averting and eliminating the danger is the conclusion of an international agreement to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

38. They show, thirdly, that in view of the rapid development of nuclear technology and certain aspects of the international situation, this is a particularly urgent task. In other words, having regard to the practical possibilities which several countries already have for manufacturing nuclear weapons, and to the desire displayed by other countries to possess such weapons, the agreement which will put an end to the spread of nuclear weapons should be concluded within the shortest possible time.

39. Such is the purport of the resolutions of the United Nations. And here too, several delegations have put before us some pertinent reasons for believing that the point has been reached where the last chance must be seized.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

40. My delegation considers that such fears are in no way exaggerated and correspond to the gravity of the situation. For this, undoubtedly, is the reality. A few days ago, at the meeting of 23 May, our colleague from Czechoslovakia, Mr. Winkler, very opportunely reminded us that this reality, as shown by the facts and the experts, presents itself in truly appalling aspects (ENDC/298, para. 54). Several countries which have not hitherto possessed nuclear weapons would be in a position to become militarily nuclear Powers because existing nuclear installations are producing sufficient quantities of fissile material to manufacture, in the very near future, thousands of atomic bombs. What this means is well known and needs no comment. Resolution 2153 (XXI) (ENDC/185) of the United Nations General Assembly, which has been quoted on many occasions, leaves no doubt about the interpretation to be given to a fact of this kind. An increase in the number of Powers possessing nuclear weapons can have but one effect - that of further worsening international relations and increasing the risks of a nuclear war.

41. I should like to add that a purely quantitative and arithmetical increase in the number of nuclear countries and access to nuclear weapons by newcomers are far from enabling us to imagine the political and psychological tension and confusion which would ensue. It is more than obvious that the armaments race in every direction and sector will go on at a rate which is impossible to foresee. For, side by side with the multiplications of the number of nuclear countries, there would be an increase in the number of countries which would regard themselves as threatened and which in consequence would be drawn into the infernal race.

42. In saying this I in no way wish to dramatize by anticipation but rather to make a simple observation which could very well turn out to fall short of reality. Consequently, the possibility of an increase in the number of nuclear countries makes it absolutely essential to take the only path which still remains open in order to preserve peace and avoid catastrophe. Whether one wishes it or not, one must recognize the existence of this dilemma - either we succeed within the shortest period in concluding a non-proliferation treaty, or, proliferation making such a solution more and more difficult and even impossible, we resign ourselves to the irreparable. Of course, I fully realize that I am not saying anything new. But if I venture to be insistent, it is because I am convinced that at the present stage of our discussion one has the right to do so for, it seems to me, the following reasons:

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43. Firstly, because the problem of non-proliferation is not a problem like so many others. There are not several ways of solving this problem. There is only one - the conclusion of a treaty.

44. Secondly, because at the present time we are faced with an extremely important fact which is favourable to the solution of the problem. I am referring to the rapprochement in the positions of the two great nuclear Powers - the Soviet Union and the United States - which opens up for the negotiations prospects of success that did not exist before.

45. Thirdly, because my delegation, having followed with all due attention the statements devoted to a problem of such great importance, has sometimes derived from them impressions that cannot but give rise to a certain perplexity.

46. I sincerely wish that I may be mistaken; perhaps it is only a matter of wrong impressions. It is none the less true that often enough the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is examined from a standpoint dominated by concern about what would happen if an agreement were reached. I fully understand the reasons for wishing to be cautious in carrying on a discussion of this kind, bearing in mind all the interests at stake. I should also like to express my deepest respect for the right of everyone to envisage the problems as he sees them, to pass upon them the judgements which he believes to be right, the more so as several of the questions raised are of great importance. Nevertheless, there is one thing which appears to us to be undeniable - that is, that the true problem referred to the Committee by the United Nations is this: to eliminate the danger of proliferation, to stop the increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons, before it is too late.

47. That is the problem to which we must find a solution - a solution which must meet the hopes of the peoples and the imperative requirements of the international situation, which is full of "political storms", according to the phrase used by the representative of the United Kingdom at the meeting of 21 March (ENDC/PV.295, para. 34). It is enough to think of the terrible trial which the American aggression in Vietnam constitutes for world peace, in order to understand how menacing these storms are.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

48. One of the problems arousing general interest and which fully deserves very particular attention is that of the link between a non-proliferation treaty and scientific and technical progress. In these days progress in the vast fields of science and technology is closely connected with the possibilities of utilizing nuclear energy. This is one of the great problems of our times. The use of nuclear energy has already become practicable and opens up greater prospects each day for the economic development of all countries. It is certain that nuclear energy will play a role of the foremost importance and that it is destined to become the energy of the great future of humanity.

49. It goes without saying that no obstacle should make it difficult - let alone impossible - for any country to use nuclear energy for its economic development. Nevertheless, in view of the nature of nuclear energy and the possibilities of obtaining certain by-products of its peaceful utilization - products which could be diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons - there must be a primary link between the non-proliferation treaty and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. There must exist between the two a kind of symmetry - the non-proliferation treaty must not set up any obstacles to peaceful use and the latter must not open up a breach in the treaty, that is to say, any possibility of manufacturing military nuclear devices.

50. This latter possibility would, in our opinion, constitute more than a mere infringement of the non-proliferation treaty. In fact, in view of the risks involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, of which we have already spoken, it would end by making illusory the hopes that have been placed on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Practised on a wide scale and by a large number of countries - and the logic of proliferation will have this effect - the result will be an increase in the number of nuclear countries, which is what the treaty was intended to prevent, and finally nuclear war.

51. On the other hand, it must always be borne in mind that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the economic development which must normally follow will be possible only in conditions of peace. Yet it would be impossible to create such conditions in an atmosphere of what might be described as a permanent proliferation which would exist in the absence of a non-proliferation treaty. If

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

nuclear energy or the by-products of its peaceful use were to be devoted to military purposes, if the armaments race were to be continued, it would be futile to talk of rapid economic development, for obvious reasons: on the one hand, because enormous resources would go to swell military budgets more and more and, on the other, because the risks of a destructive nuclear war would paralyse the efforts of the majority of countries until the fatal moment of conflict.

52. There is a fundamental contradiction between proliferation of nuclear weapons and economic development, a contradiction of the same kind as that which exists between the armaments race in general and economic development. It is well known to what extent the enormous burden of armaments slows down the economic development of all countries without exception, even the richest. Let us recall in passing that, according to United Nations data, military expenditures attained in 1966 the astronomical sum of \$170,000 million which, according to the same sources, represents three-quarters of the total national revenue of all the developing countries put together. Add to that the fact that 20 million persons are directly employed in the military services and that 30 million others are engaged in military activities, and we shall have an idea of what that represents. Is it possible to hope, in these circumstances, that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will suffice to perform the miracle of filling the barrel of the Danaïdes?

53. In our opinion, it is more than obvious that only the existence of a non-proliferation treaty will have the effect, amongst others, of concentrating all efforts and all resources upon improving nuclear technology and harnessing the latter to the needs of the economy. In this way the solution of the problem of non-proliferation becomes, as was stated by the Head of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Roshchin, at our meeting on 18 May, "one of the most important conditions" that would ensure for the non-nuclear countries a rapid development of their peaceful atomic industry (ENDC/PV.297, para. 15).

54. Some opinions have been put forward here on the subject of a collateral question - that concerning the possible use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. We take the view that this question is far from being topical from either the technical or the economic point of view. Furthermore, in view of the specific nature of the question, which has been stressed on several occasions, we consider that it should be the subject of separate studies.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

55. We should like to dwell briefly on the link which exists between the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the more general problem disarmament. I hasten to say at once that, for my delegation, this link is not only formal, but very real, and that the question of non-proliferation forms an integral part of the vast complex of disarmament problems and also of the efforts required to enable us to achieve the great objective which general and complete disarmament represents. For my part, I believe that we must refrain from adopting a formal approach to the problem of non-proliferation. We know, for instance, that the fact of declaring a zone free of nuclear weapons does not constitute a disarmament measure. Nevertheless, no one can deny the favourable effect which such a fact may have within the framework of disarmament.

56. Proliferation of nuclear weapons being certainly an armament measure, we must, as in the case of a disease, stick to common sense which requires first the stopping of the malady before proceeding to the treatment. The world will not be delivered from the affliction of nuclear armaments if the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons is allowed to increase. The measures to check the disease must be taken at the present stage when it is still possible to halt the spread of the danger.

57. That, in our opinion, is the meaning of the passage in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) where it is stated, with reference to the non-proliferation treaty, that: "The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;" (ENDC/161) I emphasize here the words "a step towards the achievement". In our opinion, they mean that the treaty should create favourable conditions for the solution of other disarmament problems and cannot be interpreted in the sense that those problems are to be solved by the treaty itself.

58. This meaning of a non-proliferation treaty is aptly brought out by the statement made on 9 February by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kosygin, who said: "We regard the solution of the problem of non-proliferation as an important step towards the subsequent nuclear disarmament of States".

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

59. We understand the wish to take immediately decisive measures of nuclear disarmament. I will add at once that not only do we understand, but we also share it without reservation. We are prepared to support it to the utmost, as we have done in the past when, together with the Soviet delegation and the delegations of the other socialist countries, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has pressed unremittingly, in this Committee and in other international forums, for a radical solution of disarmament problems, including nuclear disarmament. I repeat: our delegation is always prepared to support such proposals as would solve these problems, and particularly those whose object is to ban the use of nuclear weapons, to prohibit the manufacture of such weapons, to destroy those in existence and their delivery vehicles, to liquidate the enormous military apparatus whose weight threatens to crush the peoples or to deliver them over to military destruction.

60. However, we all know how many obstacles, which are difficult to overcome for the time being, prevent such a solution, and we know where they come from. To know these obstacles it suffices to consult the verbatim records of the 300 meetings of our Committee. That is precisely what obliges us to be more realistic when discussing the problem of non-proliferation. It is moreover a necessity which has long been realized by a number of delegations.

61. In this connexion I should like to recall the statement made at the meeting of 2 September 1965 by the representative of Ethiopia, who said:

"Nuclear disarmament is a long-term and difficult task that we must eventually achieve in order to survive. We can achieve this goal not by a single stroke but by measured steps ..."

It is only because we are sufficiently realistic to believe that our planet is cursed to live with nuclear weapons for some time to come that we have undertaken the hard search to limit their diffusion. Our faith in being able to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will be attenuated if we link this goal to a series of disarmament measures ... The temptation to seek to achieve simultaneously both objectives - that is, far-reaching disarmament measures and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons - would inevitably lead us into a position where we might miss the chance of attaining one of our objectives." (ENDC/PV.229, pp. 13-14)

62. Moreover, obviously inspired by similar fears, the representative of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, reminded us on 21 March of the aphorism to the effect that sometimes "the best is the enemy of the good" (ENDC/PV.295, para. 20).

63. Before concluding, I should like to mention a little event in which we are taking part here in our Committee. We have today reached our 300th meeting. Some may perhaps feel on this occasion that the zeros in that number are more eloquent than the rest. I do not know whether they are right, but we can recall, without however wishing to celebrate the occasion, how much work, effort and hope are linked to those 300 meetings. It is now generally recognized that disarmament has become the number one problem of world politics. Would it be presumptuous to think that the work carried out by the Eighteen-Nation Committee has contributed in a very large measure to this general awareness? As the Committee passes the three hundred meeting mark, what we can hope for is to carry on our task without ever yielding to discouragement, in order to succeed in solving the problem entrusted to us, beginning with the one now on our agenda, the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 300th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador M. Blusztajn, representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representative of Sweden and Bulgaria.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 1 June 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.